As the United States watched the skies after the spy balloon incident, China may have acted at sea. In early February, seagoing vessels disabled the two underwater cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, a tiny group of islands just 10 nautical miles off the coast of China, to the Internet. Now, residents of the islands are facing severely limited internet connectivity until the cables are repaired. The activity looks like targeted harassment by Beijing — or an exercise in preparation for a Taiwan-wide lockdown.
On February 2, a Chinese fishing vessel sailing near the Matsu Islands severed one of the two cables connecting the islands to Taiwan proper. Then, six days later, a Chinese freighter severed the second cable. Shortly after the second cable was cut, Wong Po-tsung, vice chairman of Taiwan’s National Communications Commission, told reporters there was no evidence the incidents were intentional. It’s not uncommon for submarine cables to be damaged – but losing two cables in a row is either very unfortunate or may not be an accident. In any case, residents of the Matsu Islands are left with only rudimentary internet access: the islands’ commercial telecommunications provider, Chunghwa Telecom (CHT), has rolled out 24-hour free Wi-Fi in its shops on the islands and a backup microwave system for Telephone calls and government communications.
The approximately 12,700 inhabitants of the Matsu Islands will have to do without cables for many weeks to come; A repair ship will not arrive until April 20th at the earliest, and the repairs will take further time. The residents have experience with damaged submarine cables. CHT reports that cables were damaged five times in 2021 and four times last year, though not nearly as bad as this time. During such times of limited internet connectivity, “it would take more than 10 minutes to send a text message, and it would take even longer to send a picture,” said Lii Wen, the leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the Matsu Islands the Taipei Times, adding that “the booking system in hostels and logistics services also cannot function normally, let alone viewing content and movies on social media.”
As the United States watched the skies after the spy balloon incident, China may have acted at sea. In early February, seagoing vessels disabled the two underwater cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, a tiny group of islands just 10 nautical miles off the coast of China, to the internet. Now, residents of the islands are facing severely limited internet connectivity until the cables are repaired. The activity looks like targeted harassment by Beijing — or an exercise in preparation for a Taiwan-wide lockdown.
On February 2, a Chinese fishing vessel sailing near the Matsu Islands severed one of the two cables connecting the islands to Taiwan proper. Then, six days later, a Chinese freighter severed the second cable. Shortly after the second cable was cut, Wong Po-tsung, vice chairman of Taiwan’s National Communications Commission, told reporters there was no evidence the incidents were intentional. It’s not uncommon for submarine cables to be damaged – but losing two cables in a row is either very unfortunate or may not be an accident. In any case, residents of the Matsu Islands are left with only rudimentary internet access: the islands’ commercial telecommunications provider, Chunghwa Telecom (CHT), has rolled out 24-hour free Wi-Fi in its shops on the islands and a backup microwave system for Telephone calls and government communications.
The approximately 12,700 inhabitants of the Matsu Islands will have to do without cables for many weeks to come; A repair ship will not arrive until April 20th at the earliest, and the repairs will take further time. The residents have experience with damaged submarine cables. CHT reports that cables were damaged five times in 2021 and four times last year, though not nearly as bad as this time. During such times of limited internet connectivity, “it would take more than 10 minutes to send a text message, and it would take even longer to send a picture,” said Lii Wen, the leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the Matsu Islands the Taipei Times, adding that “the booking system in hostels and logistics services also cannot function normally, let alone viewing content and movies on social media.”
If both cables are down, even a moderately slow Internet paralyzes everyday life. Beijing is watching how the islanders are coping with this impediment to their existence – and how they manage to communicate properly with Taiwan. It also keeps tight military surveillance of the region, which it considers a breakaway region. Taiwan’s offshore islands have always been its Achilles heel; In 1958, China shelled the Matsu Islands and the neighboring island of Kinmen. Last summer, the PLA Navy conducted major drills near the island, ostensibly in response to then-US spokeswoman Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, although their large and well-executed nature suggested they had been planned well in advance .
Indeed, it is striking how often Chinese ships have damaged undersea cables connecting islands in recent years. It’s particularly striking because it’s no secret where the world’s 380 submarine cables are located. On the contrary, there are maps detailing their position to ensure fishing vessels don’t accidentally injure them while hauling their nets. Broadly speaking, this works: The International Cable Protection Committee reports that there are between 100 and 200 cases of cable damage each year, and only 50-100 of those incidents involve fishing vessels; the rest is the result of construction and other activities. So the damage to the cables connecting the Matsu Islands is disproportionately common.
Also, so far they’ve mostly included the Chinese diggers that park off the islands and dig up sand (which I wrote about last year for Foreign Policy). Given that underwater cables are 17 to 21 millimeters in diameter (about the size of a garden hose), it would take incredibly bad luck to accidentally damage them as often as Chinese ships do — let alone destroy two in one Row.
Chinese dredgers parking in Taiwanese waters and taking Taiwanese sand is classic gray area aggression: it’s not a military attack, but it’s not nothing either. In fact, every time they show up, Taiwanese Coast Guard ships must go to the site and order the ships to leave (although they cannot be sure that the uninvited visitors will do so in a timely manner). Each time, the dredgers harm marine wildlife and the seabed. And because they often damage undersea cables in the process, they affect the Matsu Islands’ ability to function and communicate with Taiwan and the rest of the world.
Given that the locations of the underwater cables are known, this frequent and now jacked-up damage to the Matsu Islands doesn’t look like accidental damage — it looks like a nuisance to Taiwan. After the recent incident, the DPP accused China of intentionally damaging the cables as they break so often. The incidents may even be a preparatory exercise for a communications disruption from Taiwan. Fifteen submarine cables connect the main island to world telecommunications.
CHT plans to at least partially ensure the connectivity of the Matsu Islands by laying another cable, this time buried under the seabed. However, the cable will not be operational until 2025. In the meantime, the CHT has to pay for the backup internet system and also waives the islanders’ internet fees. When the repair ship arrives, the two cables will cost CHT between $660,000 and $1.3 million to repair.
Incurring such costs is also part of gray area aggression. If a company suffers losses as a result of geopolitical aggression, its insurer may not cover them: Russia’s devastating NotPetya cyberattack sparked massive lawsuits between multinationals and their insurers. While CHT’s discussions with its underwriter are of course confidential, the two must agree on whether cutting the cables was accidental damage or another government-initiated damage event to weaken Taiwan. In any case, CHT or its insurer must pay for repeated damages that go far beyond what is typical for submarine cables. What if CHT withdraws from providing connectivity to the Matsu Islands on the grounds that constant cable repairs make it too difficult and too expensive? As I have pointed out in other articles and in this report, there is a risk that parts of the global business can no longer be insured as a result of geopolitical confrontations.
And there is another problem that CHT, Taiwan, and pretty much all countries face: the lack of cable ships. The reason the CHT has to wait until the end of April or later for repairs to start is because there are only 60 cable vessels around. (Check them out here.) It’s a good thing these run-down looking ships exist; In fact, the internet wouldn’t work without them. But the cable ships are not only few, they are also getting on in years. As Dan Swinhoe reports for DCD Magazine, no new cable ships were delivered between 2004 and 2010, and only five ships were delivered between 2011 and 2020. “Only eight of these 60 ships are under the age of 18, most between 20 and 30 years old. 19 are in their 30s and one is in their 50s,” notes Swinhoe. Like the world’s submarine cables, cable ships are privately owned – and the market doesn’t seem interested in making things better just yet. This could be an opportunity for governments – particularly the world’s dominant maritime powers like the United States – to step in. Alternatively, cable operators, which include not only telecom companies but also tech giants like Google, might want to buy their own cable ships.
In the future, more submarine cables will be laid under the seabed to make them less vulnerable to damage – but that too depends on the 60 cable vessels available. So if Chinese fishing and cargo ships plan to inadvertently damage or cut the 15 undersea cables that connect Taiwan to the rest of the world, the near future offers tantalizing prospects. Indeed, given the world’s dependence on cables and the few ships that can service them, the near future holds tantalizing prospects for any country willing to cause a few more “accidents” at sea.
Cable sabotage could become the blockade of our time – and unlike the blockades of previous generations, it can be done stealthily. No wonder other telecom operators are investigating CHT’s backup operations, as they too may be forced to deploy such measures in Taiwan and beyond. And let’s hope many countries study Taiwan’s response. Responding to a devastating but invisible blockade could become one of the most thorny diplomatic challenges facing Western governments.
